Social Security Administration Nonacquiescence on the Standard for Evaluating Pain by Masson, Erin Margaret
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 36 | Issue 5 Article 6
Social Security Administration Nonacquiescence
on the Standard for Evaluating Pain
Erin Margaret Masson
Copyright c 1995 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Erin Margaret Masson, Social Security Administration Nonacquiescence on the Standard for Evaluating
Pain, 36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1819 (1995), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss5/6
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
NONACQUIESCENCE ON THE STANDARD FOR
EVALUATING PAIN*
For more than a decade, the Fourth Circuit has battled the
Social Security Administration (SSA), demanding that the SSA
comply with the well-established Fourth Circuit legal standard
for evaluating pain in Social Security disability claims.' The
Hyatt v. Heckler battle raged through seven district court deci-
sions, four court of appeals decisions, and one Supreme Court
decision.'
Determining eligibility for Social Security disability benefits
requires evaluating allegations of pain.' Throughout Hyatt, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) required
that, in order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must present
objective medical evidence of both the existence and seventy of
pain.' The Fourth Circuit required objective medical evidence of
the existence of pain but required consideration of subjective as
* I am deeply indebted to Grace Masson, Esq., for her insights into the Social
Security disability programs as well as her continued support and encouragement.
1. See Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1980). This Note uses the
Fourth Circuit as a vivid example, but this same issue has been litigated elsewhere.
See, e.g., Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 164 (10th Cir. 1987) (class action requiring
consideration of relevant evidence of pain once a loose nexus between impairment
and pan is shown).
2. Hyatt v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 985 (D.N.C.), amended, 586 F. Supp. 1154
(W.D.N.C. 1984), vacated, 757 F.2d 1455 (4th Cir.), remanded to 618 F. Supp. 227
(W.D.N.C. 1985), cert. granted and vacated, 476 U.S. 1167, aff'd zn part, remanded to
807 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987) and remanded to 118
F.R.D. 572 (W.D.N.C. 1988) and remanded to 711 F. Supp. 833 (W.D.N.C.) and 711
F. Supp. 837 (W.D.N.C. 1989), aff'd in part, amended in part, vacated in part, 899
F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1990) remanded to 757 F. Supp. 685 (W.D.N.C. 1991), aff'd, 6
F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court declined to enter the foray on the sec-
ond petition for certiorari. Bowen v. Hyatt, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
3. The "SSA is 'probably the largest adjudicative agency in the western world."'
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 446 (1988) (quoting Heckler v. Campbell, 461
U.S. 458, 461 n.2 (1983)). Pain was alleged in 60-80% of the approximately 2.4 mil-
lion applications for disability benefits filed in 1992. National Association of Social
Security Claimant Representatives (NOSSCR), GAO Study Documents SSA's Deterzo-
rating Service for Disability Claimants, SOC. SEC. F., Jan. 1994, at 3.
4. Hyatt, 579 F. Supp. at 994.
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well as objective evidence in evaluating the severty of pain.5 The
substantive question is whether, once objective medical evidence
substantiates the existence of pain, other evidence must be con-
sidered in determining the severity of the pain.6
The SSA, throughout Hyatt, followed a policy of nonacquies-
cence,7 refusing to be bound by federal district and appellate
court decisions beyond the case of the particular litigant.' Non-
acquiescence is a controversial policy that allows federal agencies
such as the SSA to act without check until Congress or the Su-
preme Court intervenes. As the Hyatt litigation demonstrates,
without resolution of the procedural question of nonacquiescence,
substantive questions cannot be resolved.9
The initial district court decision in Hyatt found the
Secretary's position frivolous. ° The court forced the SSA to pay
Hyatt's attorneys' fees, based on the SSA's conscious and willful
disregard of the law "' Not only did the SSA act "in bad faith,
vexatiously and wantonly,"' 2 but the SSA's position was "not
even marginally justifiable, and it fairly may be characterized as
outrageous, at best, both before this case was filed and during
the course of this suit."13 Nonetheless, the SSA pursued the
lawsuit for a decade, at a huge expense to taxpayers. 4 To truly
resolve the substantive issues, either the Supreme Court or Con-
gress should ban intracircuit nonacquiescence by ruling that
5. Id. at 1000.
6. Other evidence includes statements from the claimant, reports from treating or
examimng physicians or psychologists, and statements or reports from other persons
about the claimant's medical condition and daily activities. 56 Fed. Reg. 57,933
(1991).
7. See infra notes 149-87 and accompanying text.
8. The SSA does "not believe that a Federal agency is constitutionally precluded
from relitigating an issue within a circuit that has previously issued a ruling adverse
to the Government's position." 55 Fed. Reg. 1012, 1014 (1990).
9. See znfra notes 158-87 and accompanying text.
10. Hyatt, 579 F Supp. at 1000-01.
11. The SSA disregarded both the court's order to evaluate subjective evidence of
pain and the court's order to change SSA policy within the circuit. Id. at 1000.
12. Hyatt v. Heckler, 586 F Supp. 1154, 1155 (W.D.N.C. 1984), vacated, 757 F.2d
1455 (4th Cir. 1985).
13. Id. at 1156.
14. The government paid Hyatt's legal expenses, wlch totalled $343,652.21. Hyatt
v. Shalala, 6 F.3d 250, 251 (1993). Assuming similar costs for the SSA and the judi-
ciary, this case cost taxpayers over a million dollars.
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federal agencies must follow the judicially-established law of the
circuit which would review the action as long as the venue is
known with substantial certainty
With the SSA's promulgation of new pain regulations in 1991,
the Fourth Circuit won a tentative victory of the substantive is-
sue-subjective evidence of the severity of pain can be considered
in determining disability '" However, the SSA prevailed on the
procedural issue-the substantive change occurred without the
SSA submitting to federal court authority 16 The casualties of
this battle are the soldier litigants, whose benefits have been
delayed or denied, and the citizen taxpayers, who subsidize the
battalions of lawyers employed by both sides. 7
This Note introduces the Hyatt litigation by summarizing the
Social Security disability application process, the class of claim-
ants, and the procedural history of the case. The second section
discusses the legislative history of the Social Security Act, focus-
ing on congressional, judicial, and administrative interpretations.
The third section demonstrates that the substantive requirement
of objective medical evidence of the severity of pain has limited
usefulness and certainly cannot justify nonacquiescence. The
fourth section argues that nonacquiescence is indefensible and
fundamentally unfair. This Note concludes that the Supreme
Court or Congress must resolve the procedural issue of nonacqul-
escence in order to determine properly substantive issues such as
the standard for evaluating pain.
15. 56 Fed. Reg. 57,928, 57,929 (1991); see znfra text accompanying notes 121-24.
Although this Note focuses on evaluating pain, similar evidentiary battles are fought
regularly, for example, over the treating physician rule, see Stieberger v. Sullivan, 738
F. Supp. 716, 732-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), and over the standard for evaluating alcohol-
ism, see Wilkerson v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 826, 844-47 (3d Cir. 1990). Consistently, the
SSA has refused to acquiesce in the federal court decisions regarding these issues. Id.
at 847.
16. The new pain regulations "make no substantive change in [SSA] policy," 56
Fed. Reg. at 57,928, and never mention adverse court decisions, 56 Fed. Reg. at
57,931.
17. See znfra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
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HYATT V HECKLER
Although the Hyatt v. Heckler battle lasted a decade, 18 the
issue remained constant-whether, procedurally, the courts could
force SSA compliance with the Fourth Circuit's substantive legal
standard for evaluating pain in Social Security disability claims.
The class action originated with three class members, although
the actual size of the class grew steadily throughout the litiga-
tion.1 9
Applicatzon Process
The Hyatt class members fought for benefits within the SSA,
struggling through the many steps and stages of review, before
appealing to federal court. ° Appeals within the SSA begin with
two paper hearings,21 proceed to a hearing before an administra-
tive law judge (AIJ),22 and end with a paper review by a nation-
al appeals council.2" Once claimants exhaust their administrative
remedies,24 they may appeal to the federal courts, beginning
with the district court and ending, for those who make it that
far, with the Supreme Court.25
18. Plamtiff Hyatt applied for reinstatement of Social Security disability benefits in
1981. Hyatt v. Heckler, 579 F Supp. 985, 989 (W.D.N.C. 1984), vacated, 757 F.2d
1455 (4th Cir. 1985). After exhausting administrative appeals as required by law, in
1983 Hyatt initiated a class action suit in federal district court. Id. Ten years after
first appealing to federal court and twelve years after first appealing to the SSA,
Hyatt's case continued. Hyatt v. Shalala, 6 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 1993).
19. By 1988, approximately 77,000 class members had been identified. Hyatt v.
Heckler, 711 F Supp. 837, 838 n.1 (W.D.N.C. 1989), aff'd in part, amended in part,
vacated in part, 899 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1990).
20. See Hyatt, 579 F. Supp at 989-92.
21. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.611, 416.325 (1994) (application); zd. §§ 404.907-.913,
416.1407-.1413 (reconsideration).
22. Id. §§ 404.929, 416.1429.
23. Id. §§ 404.967, 416.1467.
24. Requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before allowing claimants to
appeal to federal court has been criticized when the SSA nonacquiesces because it
"put[s] claimants to further expense and meaningless appeals by forcing them to
exhaust their adminstrative remedies before they can receive benefits." Johnson v.
United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 969 F.2d 1082, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
25. If a social security claimant
has the determination and the financial and physical strength and lives
long enough to make it through the admimstrative process, he can turn
to the courts and ultimately expect them to apply the law as announced
1822
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At each stage of administrative review, an examiner evaluates
the claim using a five-step process. First, the claimant cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity 2 Second, the claimant
must demonstrate the existence and severity of a medically deter-
minable impairment" or impairments,28 preventing the
claimant from working.29
Third, if the claimant's impairment "meets" or "equals" a
Listing of Impairments, the claimant is per se disabled. ° Pain,
by itself, is not currently a listing, although its absence is con-
troversial."' If the claimant demonstrates a nonexertional im-
[by the circuit]. If exhaustion overtakes him and he falls somewhere along
the road lading to such ultimate relief, the nonacquiescence and the
resulting termination stand. Particularly with respect to the types of mdi-
viduals here concerned, whose resources are by definition, relatively
limited, such a dual system of law is prejudicial and unfair.
Id. at 1092-93 (quoting Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 28 (C.D. Cal. 1983)).
26. This step ensures that the person is totally and permanently disabled. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1510, 416.910, 404.1571-.1576, 416.971-.976.
27. The claimant must demonstrate the existence of a physical or psychological
unpairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508-1509, 404.1520-.1521, 416.913, 416.920-.921. The
claimant must further demonstrate, using medical signs and laboratory findings, a
severe inpairment by showing the intensity, persistence, and effect of the pamn on
the clainant's ability to work. Id. §§ 404.1520-.1521, 416.920-.921.
28. When more than one inpamnent exists, severity is determined by the com-
bined effects of the impairments. Id. § 404.1522(b). For example, each of the repre-
sentative Hyatt class members suffered from a combination of rnpairments. Hyatt v.
Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 985, 988-91 (D.N.C. 1984), vacated, 757 F.2d 1455 (4th Cir.
1985).
29. Working is defined as the ability to engage in basic work activities, including,
but not limited to (1) physical functions such as walking, lifting, reaching, or carry-
ing, (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking, (3) understanding, carrying out,
and remembering simple instructions, (4) use of judgment, (5) responding appropr-
ately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations, and, (6) dealing with
changes in a routine work setting. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521.
30. The Listings of Impairments (Listings) identify common impairments. See List-
ings of Impairments, 20 C.F.RI § 404, subpart P, app. 1. A claimant "meets" a listing
by demonstrating the necessary symptoms, or "equals" a listing by demonstrating
symptoms eqmvalent to the symptoms listed in the Listings. Id. §§ 404.1526-.1528,
416.926-.928.
31. The Committee on Pain, Disability and Chromc Illness Behavior Minority Re-
port recommended that chronic pain syndrome be included as the following listing:
14.00 Impairment due Primarily to Pain:
A. Pam, as evidenced by:
1. Measurable impairment of function with physical tissue damage in
body parts specifically related to the complaints of pain; OR
2. a. Pain complaints apparently disproportionate and/or mappropri-
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pairment,32 she can skip this stage of review and move to the
next step.33  Limitations from pain can be exertional,34
nonexertional, or both. 5
Fourth, the claimant must be unable to perform past relevant
work. Finally, once the claimant establishes a medically-deter-
minable, severe impairment that prevents her from performing
ate in location, intensity or duration to the physical damage and/or its
normally expected healing time;
AND
b. Behavioral manifestations of pamn which must include THREE of
the following:
(1) Preoccupation with pain as evidenced by persistent and repeated
complaints, or willingness to undergo repeated painful diagnostic or ther-
apeutic procedures in search of a cure; (2) Overutilization of health care
system as evidenced by frequency of physician visits, or surgical proce-
dures, or frequent changes of health care professionals; (3) Persistent ex-
cessive use of analgesic and/or sedative drugs; (4) Consistent audible and
body language displays such as grimacing, bracing, guarding movements,
or disturbances of station or gait as observed by physicians, interviewers,
associates, family, and other observers; (5) Other accepted, objectifiable
pam-related behaviors such as sleep disturbances, eating disorders, or
sexual dysfunction.
B. Frequent and/or persistent episodes of ALL of the following due to
pain:
1. Marked restriction of activities of daily living; AND
2. Marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; AND
3. Failure to complete tasks in a timely manner; AND
4. Marked restriction in objectifiable functional capacity to perform
basic work activities.
Commission on the Evaluation of Pain, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (HHS),
Report of the Commission on the Evaluation of Pam (1986) reprinted in 1 SOCIAL
SECURITY PRACTICE GUIDE § 9.02[41 (Supp. 1993) [hereinafter Pain Committee Re-
port].
32. Non-exertional impairments refer to job limitations other than those related to
physical strength, such as, but not limited to, nervousness, anxiety, depression, diffi-
culty concentrating, difficulty in understanding detailed instructions, and problems
with seeing, hearing, reaching, stooping, or crawling. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569a,
416.969a.
33. See id. §§ 404.1569a(c)(2), 416.969a(c)(2).
34. Exertional impairments refer to strength demands of a job such as sitting,
standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling. Id. §§ 404.1569a(b),
416.969a(b).
35. Id. §§ 404.1569a(a), 416.969a(a).
36. This determination involves looking at the claimant's residual functional capaci-
ty, id. §§ 404.1545-.1546, 416.945-.946, or her ability to work, taking into account
vocational considerations of age, education, and work experience. See id. §§ 404.1560-
.1565, 416.960-.965.
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her past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Secretary to
show that work which the claimant is capable of performing is
available in significant amounts in the national economy " If a
claimant, such as Hyatt, fails any of these five steps, her claim
will be denied.
Class Members
Patrick Hyatt, the first class member, suffered from degenera-
tive disc disease, post-lumbrosacral fusion problems, and depres-
sive reaction."8 Back operations, including several lumbar lami-
nectomies with removal of ruptured intervertebral discs, left him
suffering continuous, disabling back and leg pain. 9 In 1981,
after receiving Social Security disability benefits for seven years,
the North Carolina Department of Human Resources Disability
Determination Services (DDS), which handles SSA disability
claims in North Carolina through the application of SSA regula-
tions, notified Hyatt that because his disability had ceased, his
benefits were being terminated-although there was no evidence
of medical improvement. 0
Hyatt applied to have his disability benefits reinstated, but his
claim was denied upon reconsideration. 1 Hyatt appealed to a
Social Security ALJ who again denied benefits, although Hyatt's
regular treating physician, a neurosurgeon, testified that Hyatt
was "totally and permanently disabled for any type of work and
has been for quite some time."42 The AJ found that Hyatt did
not suffer from a severe impairment.43 The SSA Appeals Council
37. See zd. §§ 404.1566, 416.966. The Secretary determines the claimant's ability to
perform certain types of work by analyzing the claimant's age, education, and previ-
ous work experience. See id. §§ 404.1569, 416.969; id. § 404, subpart P, app. 2.
38. Hyatt v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 985, 989 (D.N.C. 1984), vacated, 757 F.2d 1455
(4th Cir. 1985).
39. Id. at 988-89.
40. Id. at 989. The SSA's termination process was severely criticized and is no
longer in effect. See znfra text accompanying note 91.
41. The reconsideration decision reformed Hyatt "that although he suffered from
'discomfort,' he did not suffer from objective physical impairments that would prevent
him from doing work activity." Hyatt, 579 F. Supp. at 989.
42. The treating physician's reports document ten years of "continuing and severe
pain." Id.
43. The ALJ disregarded the treating physician's diagnosis, stating that the neuro-
1825
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declined review of the ALJ decision.44
In the fall of 1983, Hyatt appealed to the federal district court
in a class action on behalf of all simila ly situated claimants."
The trial court found that the loss of benefits caused Hyatt and
his family "severe financial distress" including the loss of their
home, automobile, and personal possessions, as well as an inabili-
ty to afford adequate clothing and food.4"
Other members of the class suffered similar hardships.
Herman Caudle, the second Hyatt class member, suffered from
hypertension with Grade II retinopathy, exogenous obesity, pas-
sive-dependent personality, and depressive reaction with sleep
disorder.4" The DDS terminated Caudle's Social Security bene-
fits in 1983."8 He appealed, but his claim was denied upon recon-
sideration and at a hearing before an AUJ, who found that
Caudle's subjective complaints did not demonstrate a severe
impairment by objective clinical findings.49 Caudle appealed to
the SSA Appeals Council, but before its decision could be ren-
dered, he died, "apparently from the hypertension and other
ailments which had disabled him for several years."5 Caudle's
treating physician concluded that Caudle did not receive neces-
sary medical treatment, including hospitalization, because his
benefits, including medical insurance, were terminated.5
Mary Lovingood, the third Hyatt class member, suffered from
chest pain, high blood pressure, and back and leg pain.52 A fifty-
seven-year-old woman unable to read or write, Lovingood re-
surgeon "was 'overly impressed with the claimant's complaints of pamn,' and that the
job of SSA was to determine whether a claimant is disabled 'on the basis of medical
evidence and other findings."' Id.
44. Id.
45. Class actions are a common way to overcome the SSA's policy of nonacquies-
cence, whereby federal court decisions are binding only on the particular litigant. By
including a large class, the courts avoid ruling on the same issue time after time.
Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Social Security Administration Nonacquiescence: The Need for
Legzslative Curbs on Agency Discretion, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 399, 414 (1989).
46. Hyatt, 579 F. Supp. at 989-90.





52. Id. at 991.
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ceived disability benefits from 1974 until the DDS terminated her
benefits in 1983."S The DDS explained that "'[alithough you
may have pain in your back and legs at times, you are able to
stand, walk, and use your legs in a normal manner."'5 4 No medi-
cal evidence supported this finding.55 Lovlngood applied for recon-
sideration, but her claim was denied because she had not demon-
strated a severe impairment and did not meet the listings.56 Her
appeal for a hearing before an ALJ, filed on October 15, 1983,
was still pending as of the February 14, 1984, district court deci-
sion."7 Loss of her benefits caused anxiety, depression, and an
inability to afford food, rent, utilities, insurance, and medical
bills."
The sympathetic nature of the Hyatt class representatives is
not unusual. 9 Loss of benefits caused other class members emo-
tional distress, financial losses, and physical deterioration.' Res-
toration of benefits would provide class members with minimal
financial assistance as well as medical insurance.6"
Although Fourth Circuit law requires consideration of subjec-
tive allegations of pain in adjudicating Social Security claims, the
ALJs did not follow circuit law in these cases. Instead, they fol-







59. "Disability cases often tug at the heartstrings." Alan Goldhammer & Susan
Bloom, Recent Changes in the Assessment of Pain in Disability Claims Before the
Social Security Administration, 3 SOC. SEC. REP. SERV. 1119, 1129 (1984).
60. Loss of benefits caused "deep emotional distress due to resultant financial pres-
sures, wich tends only to aggravate the severity of their physical or emotional dis-
abilities," as well as the "inability of these persons to secure proper medical treat-
ment for the very conditions from which they are disabled." Hyatt, 579 F. Supp. at
991-92.
61. Benefits include monthly living allowances and access to medical care through
Medicare or Medicaid. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, OVERVIEW OF ENTITLE-
MENT PROGRAMS, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1994). The financial assistance is minimal.
For example, in 1992, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) assured beneficiaries an
annual income of $5064, significantly lower than the poverty income guideline of
$6810. Peter V Lee et aL, Engendering Social Security Disability Determinations: The
Path of a Woman Claimant, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1477, 1483 (1994).
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disregard judicially-created legal standards.62 The struggle be-
tween the Fourth Circuit and the SSA dragged out the litigation
while leaving the pain standard uncertain for the claimants,
many of whom desperately needed their benefits.
Procedural History
The procedural history of this class action is "extensive and
procedurally tortured." 3 The class of claimants originally sued
to enjoin the Secretary from disregarding the Fourth Circuit pain
evaluation standard.' The district court granted the injunction,
certified and enlarged the class, awarded attorneys' fees and
expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), and
ordered the Secretary to comply with Fourth Circuit law 65 At
the insistence of the plaintiffs, the district court amended the
EAJA fee order to grant the award based on the SSA's bad faith
pursuit of the litigation.66
The Secretary appealed the merits and fee award to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, who vacated the fee award for reconsid-
eration and remanded, directing the district court to dismiss class
members who had not exhausted administrative remedies and
allowing the Secretary to reconsider his policy of nonacquiescence
under the new pain standard in the 1984 amendments to the
Social Security Act.67
On remand and reconsideration, the district court upheld the
previous fee award and granted two new motions for attorneys'
fees but reduced the total award by five percent in light of Hyatt
L6 Plaintiffs also petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Su-
62. See znfra text accompanying notes 149-87.
63. Hyatt v. Shalala, 6 F.3d 250, 252 (4th Cir. 1993); see supra note 2.
64. Hyatt, 579 F Supp. at 988.
65. Id. at 1002-04. The Equal Access to Justice Act allows courts to award
attorneys' fees to litigants when the government's position lacks substantial justifica-
tion or is pursued in bad faith. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988).
66. Hyatt v. Heckler, 586 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (W.D.N.C. 1984), vacated, 757 F.2d
1455 (4th Cir. 1985).
67. Hyatt v. Heckler, 757 F.2d 1455, 1460-62 (4th Cir. 1984) (Hyatt 1); see infra
text accompanying notes 91, 149-87.
68. Hyatt v. Heckler, 618 F Supp. 227, 233 (W.D.N.C. 1985), cert. granted and
vacated, 476 U.S. 1167 (1986).
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preme Court. 9 The Supreme Court vacated the decision in Hyatt
I and remanded for the circuit court to consider the class enlarge-
ment issue.70
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's original decision enlarging the class,
affirmed the district court's award of attorneys' fees, reinstated
the five percent deducted by the district court on remand, and
ordered the district court to award additional fees for appellate
services.7' The court also denied the Secretary's request for a
rehearing en banc,72 and the Supreme Court denied the
Secretary's petition for certiorari. On remand, the district
court ordered the Secretary to reevaluate the claims of the en-
larged class.74
Finding that the Secretary continued to disregard Fourth Cir-
cuit law, the district court ordered the Secretary to abide by the
district court's original pain standard.75 The court drafted a
Social Security Ruling (SSR) on the standard for evaluating pain
and ordered the SSR distributed to all SSA adjudicators in North
Carolina.7 6 The district court also granted two more motions for
attorneys' fees and costs. 7
The Secretary appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed
both the fee award and substantive order. 8 The Secretary is-
69. Hyatt v. Bowen, 476 U.S. 1167 (1986).
70. Id.
71. Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 378-83 (4th Cir. 1986) (Hyatt II), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 820 (1987).
72. Hyatt v. Shalala, 6 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 1993).
73. Bowen v Hyatt, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
74. Hyatt v. Bowen, 118 F.R.D. 572, 573 (W.D.N.C. 1987).
75. The district court found that the Secretary's proposed order would "accomplish
indirectly what the Secretary's policy of 'nonacqulescence' sought to do directly; that
is, to flout binding precedents of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals." Hyatt v.
Heckler, 711 F. Supp. 837, 839 (W.D.N.C. 1989), aff'd in part, amended zn part,
vacated in part, 899 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1990).
76. "The instructions provided with this order are necessary to ensure that the
Secretary's policy of nonacquiescence victimizes no more North Caroliians, and that
the law of this circuit applies with full force and- effect to each of their clauns." Id.
at 843-48.
77. Hyatt v. Sullivan, 711 F. Supp. 833, 834-36 (W.D.N.C. 1989), aff'd, 6 F.3d 250
(4th Cir. 1993). The fees were calculated using a market rate and totalled
$315,083.35 for fees and $28,568.86 for expenses. Id.
78. The court vacated and amended a small part of the decision. Hyatt v. Sullivan,
1829
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sued a SSR on evaluating pain that differed from the SSR or-
dered by the district court. 9 The district court ordered the Sec-
retary to amend the SSR to comply with Fourth Circuit law and
the court's order.8° Meanwhile, the Secretary had appealed the
fourth and fifth fee awards to the court of appeals, which af-
firmed the awards based on the Secretary's bad faith pursuit of
the litigation.8
Potential Resolution
The Secretary clarified the pain standard in 1991, allowing
consideration of subjective complaints of pain in determining an
individual's ability to work. 2 Although not specifically formulat-
ed in reaction to the Hyatt case, the new standard has the po-
tential to resolve the substantive issue. However, resolution is
uncertain because the regulation does not require consideration
of subjective allegations of pain, it merely allows such consider-
ation.3 Without resolution of the procedural issue of nonacqui-
escence, however, this substantive solution to Hyatt is temporary
at best. Before addressing the standard for evaluating pain or the
policy of nonacquiescence, it is helpful to understand the history
and purpose of the Social Security Act.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND PURPOSE
Congressional Actions
The Social Security Act contains essentially the same statutory
definition of disability as the original federal program developed
899 F.2d 329, 335-37 (4th Cir. 1990) (Hyatt III).
79. Hyatt v. Sullivan, 757 F Supp. 685, 686 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
80. Id.
81. Hyatt, 6 F.3d at 255-56.
82. 56 Fed. Reg. 57,928 (1991) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1994)).
83. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 ("In evaluating the intensity and persistence of
your symptoms, we consider all of the available evidence, including medical lstory,
the medical signs and laboratory findings, and statements from you, your treating or
examining physician or psychologist, or other persons about how your symptoms af-
fect you.") with 56 Fed. Reg. at 57,928 ("[A]llegations about the intensity and per-
sistence of pain or other symptoms must be conszdered in addition to the medical
signs and laboratory findings m evaluating the impairment and the extent to which
it may affect the individual's capacity for work") (emphasis added).
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in 1956.84 The definition of disability for adults is "the inability
to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expect-
ed to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months."85
To meet this definition, a claimant must have a severe impair-
ment rendering the claimant unable to perform his or her previ-
ous work or any other substantial gainful activity which exists in
the national economy in significant numbers.6 The intention of
Congress in drafting this statute was to prevent hardship by
providing benefits to all those who are unable to work by reason
of a disability 7
Increasing numbers of recipients and increasing costs inspired
the Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, which at-
tempted to protect taxpayers by terminating benefits of recipients
deemed undeserving." The amendments, however, created confu-
sion because they lacked a concrete and uniform evaluation pro-
cess.89  Deserving claimants, such as Hyatt, Caudle, and
Lovingood, lost their benefits.' Public outcry prompted swift
congressional reaction.
Responding to criticism, Congress enacted the Social Security
Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984."' The amendment clari-
fied standards of review, seeking uniformity 92 For the first time,
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (1992). In 1956 Congress passed the Social Security Disabili-
ty Act (SSDI) to provide assistance to those who had previously paid into the social
security system. Pub. L. No. 836-880, § 103, 70 Stat. 807, 815 (1956). SSDI was
supplemented m 1972 with the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, de-
signed to provide assistance to indigent claimants based on financial need. Pub. L.
No. 92-603, § 301, 86 Stat. 1329, 1465 (1972). See Goldhammer & Bloom, supra note
59.
85. 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (1994).
86. Id.
87. H.R. REP NO. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3038-80.
88. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 311(a),
94 Stat. 441 (1980).
89. 130 CONG. REC. 25,975 (1984) (statement of Sen. Dole).
90. From 1980 to 1983, approximately 500,000 recipients were terminated at the
state level. Id. Of those who appealed, approximately 60% had their benefits reinstat-
ed. Id.
91. Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (DIBRA), Pub. L. No.
98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 (1984).
92. H.R REP No. 618, supra note 87, at 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
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Congress specifically addressed the issue of pain. 3 Congress en-
acted section 3 of the act in order to provide a consistent and
uniform framework for evaluating pain,94 requiring consider-
ation of objective medical evidence of the existence of painful
impairments. 5 Although this policy required objective medical
evidence of the existence of pain, it was silent as to the standard
for evaluating the severity of pain and as to whether subjective
allegations and other evidence would be considered." Many feder-
al courts continued to grant benefits based on a claimant's sub-
jective allegations of pain, even in the absence of medical evi-
dence supporting the claim.97
Judiczal Interpretations
During the first two decades following the enactment of the
Social Security Disability Act in 1956,98 courts liberally con-
strued the definition of disability Subjective complaints of pain
were considered in addition to objectively determinable medical
conditions, and, in some cases, subjective complaints alone were
sufficient for courts to find the existence of a disability and grant
benefits.9 9 However, "[m]any decisions written on this aspect of
3039.
93. "Objective medical evidence of pain or other symptoms established by medically
acceptable clinical or laboratory techmques (for example, deteriorating nerve or mus-
cle tissue) must be considered in reaching a conclusion as to whether the individual
is under a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 423(4)(A) (1986).
94. 130 CONG. REC. 13,214-15 (1984) (statement by Sen. Long).
95. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1994); see Margaret C. Rodgers, Subjective Pazn Testi-
mony in Disability Determination Proceedings: Can Pain Alone Be Disabling?, 28 CAL.
W. L. REV. 173, 182 (1991).
96. Id., see Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir. 1991) ("If we inter-
preted the 1984 amendment and the regulations to require medical evidence to sup-
port the degree of pain, we 'would render meaningless' the requirement that an adju-
dicator must consider all relevant evidence.") (quoting Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161,
165 (9th Cir. 1987)).
97. Poskus, Analyzing and Proving Subjective Pain for Social Security Disability
Purposes, 17 COLO. LAW. 475 (1988); see also Audrey Budeit-Blondin, Pazn--Can it be
a Permanent Disability? 57 CONN. B.J. 341, 342 (1983); Rodgers, supra note 95, at
181.
98. Pub. L. No. 836-880, 70 Stat. 807 (1956).
99. 45 Fed. Reg. 55,576 (1980); see, e.g., Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161 (10th Cir.
1987); Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1982); Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649
F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981); Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1981); Myers v.
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disability litigation, even in the same circuit, seem to reach differ-
ent results despite extremely similar factual situations.""°
Even after the 1984 congressional amendments, courts tended
to continue awarding disability benefits based on subjective alle-
gations of the severity of pain even in the absence of objective
medical evidence.'" By 1991, the Seventh Circuit was the only
circuit denying claims merely for lack of objective medical evi-
dence of the severity of pain. 2
After the 1991 clarification by Congress, the Seventh Circuit
began considering subjective allegations of pain. 3 The circuit
applied the clarification retroactively because it did not change
the law but merely clarified an unsettled or confusing area of the
law 104 Thus, the 1991 standard would be applied to Hyatt,
were he in the Seventh Circuit, even though he originally ap-
plied for benefits in 1981. He would then be eligible to receive
back benefits.
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the 1991 clarifica-
tion as a new policy, which should be acknowledged as such by
the SSA.' °5 The concern of Social Security claimants such as
Califano, 611 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1980); Northcutt v. Califano, 581 F.2d 164 (8th Cir.
1978); Beavers v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 577 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1978);
Miranda v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 514 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1975);
Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975);
Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1965); Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293
(2d Cir. 1964); Page v. Celebrezze, 311 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1963).
100. Goldhanmer & Bloom, supra note 59, at 1129; see Rodgers, supra note 95, at
178 n.39.
101. Elam v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 921 F.2d 1210 (11th Cir. 1991); Bunnell, 947
F.2d 341; Penn v. Sullivan, 896 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1990); Blankenslp v. Bowen, 874
F.2d 1116 (6th Cir. 1989); Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1989); Avery v.
Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 797 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1986); Green v.
Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Ellen S. Pryor, Compensation and
the Eradicable Problems of Pain, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239 (1991).
102. See, for example, Moothart v. Bowen, 934 F.2d 114 (7th Cir. 1991), and Walk-
er v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1987), wlnch were subsequently overruled by
Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1993).
103. Pope, 998 F.2d at 485 (7th Cir. 1993) (overruling Moothart, 934 F.2d 114;
Walker, 834 F.2d 635).
104. Theoretically, this standard should have been applied originally. In fact, the
regulations specify that "these final rules make no substantive change m our policy."
56 Fed. Reg. 57,928 (1991).
105. Hyatt v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 985, 986 (D.N.C. 1984), vacated, 757 F.2d 1455
(4th Cir. 1985).
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Hyatt is that without such acknowledgement, past precedent will
be controlling and ALJs will continue to make decisions using
traditional standards, specifically by continuing to require objec-
tive clinical findings to support the severity of pain alleged." 6
Nonetheless, through the clarification, the SSA is moving closer
to the Fourth Circuit approach by allowing consideration of sub-
jective allegations of pain.
Administrative Actions
SSR 82-58 was the SSA's first policy statement on the evalua-
tion of subjective complaints such as pain. °7 The ruling re-
quired objective clinical findings, including clinical data and a
well-documented medical history, to substantiate the intensity
and persistence of pain and its effect on the claimant's ability to
work.108 Objective medical evidence was required to demon-
strate both the existence and the severity of an impairment." 9
Absent this objective medical evidence, statements by the indi-
vidual or others were disregarded.1
SSR 88-13 clarified the SSR 82-58 standard, partially in re-
sponse to the Hyatt litigation."1 The ruling requires objective
medical evidence of the existence of pain." 2 Although this policy
statement does not mandate objective medical findings support-
ing determinations of severity, the court in Hyatt found it "em-
phasizes the need to search for objective evidence of pain, its
106. Id.
107. Disability-Evaluation of Subjective Symptoms, Including Pain, Social Security




110. Hyatt, 579 F. Supp. at 994.
111. Disability--Standards for Evaluating Subjective Complaints of Pain and Other
Symptoms, Social Security Ruling 88-13, [July-Dec. Transfer Binder] Unempl. Ins.
Rep. (CCH) 1 14,118A (July 20, 1988) [hereinafter SSR 88-13].
112. However, where the degree of pam alleged is significantly greater than
that which can be reasonably anticipated based on the objective physical
findings, the adjudicator must carefully explore any additional limitation(s)
imposed by the pain on the individual's functional ability beyond those
limitations indicated by the objective medical evidence before any conclu-
sions about severity can be reached.
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intensity or degree, as well as the reliability and superiority of
that evidence."" 3 The district court in Hyatt interpreted this
ruling as merely reiterating the SSR 82-58 policy of requiring
objective medical evidence of the severity of pain."'
SSR 90-1p was issued to states in the Fourth Circuit in direct
response to Hyatt."5 SSR 90-1p is identical to SSR 88-13 except
for its statement of purpose and effective date. The new purpose
states that the goal of the ruling is to conform with Fourth Cir-
cuit law 116
The Fourth Circuit, however, objected to this ruling because it
(1) misstated the circuit's legal standard,"7 (2) failed to ac-
knowledge a change in policy,"' and (3) contained essentially
the same pain evaluation standard rejected by the court in the
original Hyatt decision.1 9 The substantive issue, the pain stan-
dard, is functionally identical to the one struck down by the first
Hyatt decision in 1984.2
Regulations promulgated by the SSA in 1991 further clarify
113. Hyatt v. Heckler, 711 F. Supp. 837, 841 (W.D.N.C. 1989), aff'd in part,
amended in part, vacated in part, 899 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1990). The stated purpose
of the ruling was to clarify existing policy, and the effective date is listed as Aug. 20,
1980, the date that SSR 82-58 went into effect. SSR 88-13, supra note 111, at 90.
114. Hyatt, 711 F. Supp. at 840.
115. Disability-Standard for Evaluating Subjective Complaints of Pain in the
Fourth Circuit, Social Security Ruling 90-1p, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,898 (1990) [hereinafter
SSR 90-1p).
116. Id. The effective date is listed as July 20, 1988, the date that SSR 88-13 went
into effect. Id.
117. The ruling states that the "Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that
SSR 88-13 was consistent with Fourth Circuit law. However the court was concerned
that some adjudicators could have read SSR 88-13 in a manner inconsistent with
circuit precedent." Id. This statement is false. The Fourth Circuit clearly and explic-
itly found that SSR 88-13 was inconsistent with circuit precedent. See Hyatt v.
Sullivan, 757 F. Supp. 685, 685 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
118. The ruling refers to itself as a clarification, never acknowledging that the SSA
changed its policy regarding the evaluation of pain. SSR 90-1p, supra note 115. With-
out an acknowledged change in policy, old precedent may still be valid. Hyatt, 757 F.
Supp. at 685.
119. The Fourth Circuit objected to the standard promulgated on the evaluation of
the severity of pain because it is identical to the standard in SSR 88-13 which, as
discussed above, appears to require objective medical evidence to support findings of
severe pain. Hyatt, 757 F. Supp at 686.
120. Hyatt v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 985, 987 (D.N.C. 1984), vacated, 757 F.2d 1455
(4th Cir. 1985).
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the pain standard.121 The current standard provides a two-step
process. First, objective medical evidence must demonstrate the
existence of an impairment which could reasonably be expected
to cause pain. 2 ' Second, subjective allegations regarding the
intensity and persistence of pain or other symptoms are consid-
ered in addition to the objective medical evidence. 121 Comments
to the regulations make clear that the SSA will not disregard
subjective evidence of pain solely because the available medical
evidence does not support it.124
The remaining question, then, is the substantive issue of why
the absence of objective medical evidence of the severity of pain
justifies the procedural nonacquiescence of the SSA throughout
the Hyatt litigation. Answering this question first requires an
understanding of the definition of pain and the definition of ob-
jective medical evidence.
OBJECTIVE MEDICAL EVIDENCE OF PAIN
Objective medical evidence of pain is an oxymoron; pain is a
subjective experience not measurable with scientific accuracy
The medical evidence that can be generated is, itself, subject to
bias, both by legal interpreters and the medical community
Thus, the substantive issue in Hyatt, the standard for evaluating
pain, may not be something the medical or legal communities can
resolve with precision. Reviewing the nature of pain and the
nature of objective medical evidence reveals that the value of
objective medical evidence is limited and certainly does not justify
nonacquiescence.
Pain
Both the medical and legal definitions of pain suggest that
there is nothing unique about pain that justifies the SSA's posi-
tion in Hyatt. Pain is a complex, subjective feeling experienced
differently by everyone. 1 5 Although the existence and severity
121. 56 Fed. Reg. 57,928 (codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929 (1992)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 57,932.
125. "Well-defined instruments for assessing pain and related variables are all based
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of pain are incapable of exact measurement, manifestations of
pain are measurable. 2 ' These imperfect measurements, howev-
er, do not provide unequivocal evidence of the severity of
pain. 2 7 Medically, there is no accurate way to generate objective
evidence of pain; to require such evidence will deprive deserving
claimants such as Hyatt of life-sustaining benefits.'28
The SSA has been criticized for making its own medical deter-
minations. 2 9 Although medical staff participate in the applica-
tion, reconsideration, and Appeal Council reviews, because they
are all paper reviews, the medical personnel never actually see
the claimant.3 ' The AUJ, who has no medical training, is the
only evaluator who actually sees the claimant.'' Thus the SSA
is not in a better position than the courts to judge the appropri-
ate pain standard; both have the same qualifications-legal train-
ing-and they rely on the same medical reports.
The legal definition of pain should focus less on the severity of
ultimately on self-report, observation, or both." Pam Committee Report, supra note
31, at 120. Other subjective complaints common in Social Security disability applica-
tions include shortness of breath, dizziness, and anxiety. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1994).
126. Visible manifestations of pain, or pain behaviors, include facial expressions,
color of skin, clamminess, and dilated pupils. Pain Committee Report, supra note 31,
at 120. These manifestations, or signs, are observable facts that can be medically
described and evaluated. Id. The manifestations differ from symptoms, which are the
claimant's subjective descriptions of pain. Id.
127. "There is no direct, objective way to measure pam." Id.
128. "We cannot conclude that Congress intended to require objective medical evi-
dence to fully corroborate the severity of pain while aware of the inability of medical
science to provide such evidence." Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir.
1991).
129. Reed v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 804 F. Supp. 914, 919 (E.D.
Mich. 1992) ("An AIJ is not a physician. Courts should be particularly skeptical
of ALJs using their own medical opinions to bridge or fill gaps in the record on the
functional limitations that are to be interpreted from the medical evidence."); Thomas
v. Sullivan, 801 F. Supp. 65, 71 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ("ALJs may not 'play doctor' by
relying on their own lay opiuons in a context where medical evidence must con-
trol.").
130. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.611, 416.325, 404.907, 416.1407, 404.967, 416.1467 (1994).
131. Id. §§ 404.929, 416.1429. "The administrative law judges themselves recently
have alleged that they are being pressured to reduce the disability rolls, to maintain
certain quotas and to follow the Social Security Administration's rules rather than
district court and court of appeals decisions." Gerald W. Heaney, Why the High Rate
of Reversals in Social Security Disability Cases?, 1 SOC. SEC. REP SERV. 1133, 1139
(1983); see DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 133 (1984).
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pain than on the effect of pain." 2 Disability benefits were de-
signed to support anyone unable to work, not just those who
suffer a particular threshold of pain. 3' As with the legal con-
cepts of good will, intent, and obscenity, pain is an inherently
subjective determination, but one that courts regularly make. 3 '
In any case, nothing suggests that the SSA is more capable of
making a pain evaluation than the courts.
The concern over allowing subjective evidence of pain derives
from the fear that people will take advantage of the sys-
tem-falsely crying "it hurts" to obtain undeserved benefits.
Those who feign illness are malingerers. However, "[t]here is a
clear consensus that malingering is not a significant problem,
that it can be diagnosed by trained professionals, medical and
other, and that increased attention to subjective evidence in the
evaluation of the existence and nature of pain will not signifi-
cantly alter this."3 5 Thus the importance of obtaining objective
medical evidence of pain is questionable because malingerers
easily are detectible; meanwhile, the value of objective medical
evidence is limited.
Objective Medical Evzdence
Objective medical evidence of disabilities theoretically reduces
the potential for bias3. by creating uniform objective stan-
132. Pain Committee Report, supra note 31, at 120.
133. 130 CONG. REC. 13,214 (1984).
134. See NOSSCR, North Carolina Class Action Pain Policy Bogs Down, Soc. SEC.
F., Oct., 1988, at 1, 13, (quoting Oct. 21, 1988, amended order m Hyatt case: "[P]ain
is no more imponderable than 'good faith,' 'mens rea,' 'fear,' and other familiar
'legal' words which juries and judges daily evaluate ").
135. Pam Committee Report, supra note 31, at 120.
136. Studies show that benefits are granted disproportionately more often to white
males than to women or racial minorities. Linda G. Mills, A Calculus for Bias: How
Malingering Females and Dependent Housewives Fare in the Social Security Disability
System, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 211, 217 (1993); see Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the
Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein &
Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV 264, 267-70 (1989) (arguing that
"sex discrmination pervades the structure of the social security system" and that
"structural inequality remains in the system to the present day"); Lee et al., supra
note 61, at 1522-23 (suggesting that racism as well as sexism affects a claimant's
ability to obtain benefits).
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dards.3 7 The dramatic inconsistency in Social Security deci-
sions,1 8 however, suggests that decisions are not made objec-
tively Rather, subtle factors influence outcomes.3 9 The credibil-
ity determinations made by ALJs and the medical determinations
made by medical professionals are particularly susceptible to bias.
ALJs assess the credibility of claimants during the hearing
stage of the appeal process. Pain, as a subjective symptom, pres-
ents the most difficult issue for judges to resolve, as judges must
rely on "innumerable, indescribable and immeasurable facts and
feelings."'140 Decisions increasingly are overturned when the
AUJ finds claimants' subjective complaints of pain not credible
because subjective allegations of pain are not supported by objec-
tive medical evidence.14 ' Credibility determinations should not
be influenced by a lack of objective medical evidence supporting
the severity of a claimant's pain. 142  o
Disability determinations are based in large measure on the
findings of physicians who generate, interpret, and explain the
medical evidence upon which the system relies.' However the
medical profession is not immune from bias. For example, gender
bias is alleged because of under-researching illnesses which affect
137. 130 CONG. REC. 13,214 (1984).
138. A 1978 Social Security Admimstration survey of 504 claims found a one-m-
eight chance that two examiners would reach the same decision. Mills, supra note
136, at 217.
139. Judge Wald, of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, notes that "there is evidence
in the legal literature to suggest that female applicants do not fare as well as
others in convincing ALT's (90% of whom are male) or medical professionals used by
the agency that their 'subjective complaints' reflect actual debilitating illnesses." Wil-
liams v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 1494, 1504 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Wald, J., dissenting).
140. Mills, supra note 136, at 223.
141. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that medical
findings that support severity of pamn are not required, and thus, adjudicator may not
discredit claimant's allegations of severity of pam solely on ground that allegations
are unsupported by objective medical evidence); Penn v. Sullivan, 896 F.2d 313, 316
(8th Cir. 1990) ("We have cautioned before that an ALT may not circumvent the rule
that objective evidence is not needed to support subjective complaints of pain under
the guise of a credibility finding.").
142. See Hyatt v. Heckler, 711 F. Supp. 837, 842 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (holding that
"lack of objective medical evidence of the degree or intensity of a claimant's pain is
not a factor that can be considered in evaluating the credibility of the claimant's
subjective evidence"), affd in part, amended in part, vacated in part, 899 F.2d 329
(4th Cir. 1990).
143. Mills, supra note 136, at 219; Lee et al., supra note 61, at 1488-94.
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14414primarily women, failing to treat women," and not taking
women's complaints seriously 146 Without proper medical treat-
ment, women are less likely than men to have corroborating
evidence of disability 141 With a standard that requires such cor-
roborating medical evidence, women are less likely to be able to
prove their disability cases.148
Because objective medical evidence of pain has limited useful-
ness, pain measurement is an inexact science. Even when evi-
dence exists, credibility determinations and medical bias limit the
accuracy of the evidence. Accordingly, the SSA's continued deter-
mination to require objective evidence in the Fourth Circuit is
difficult to justify
NONACQUIESCENCE POLICY
According to the SSA nonacquiescence policy, federal district
and appellate court decisions do not bind the SSA beyond the
case of that particular litigant; only Supreme Court decisions
create binding precedent.' The SSA is not the only agency
144. The National Institute for Health regularly excludes women from biomedical re-
search. Mills, supra note 136, at 221. In turn, the SSA excludes from its Listing of
Impairments diseases that predominantly affect women. Id. at 222. "When female
manifestations of diseases or entire maladies are excluded from the Listings, appli-
cants with these problems are likely to be denied disability benefits, particularly at
the initial stages of determination." Id. at 223.
145. Studies of the medical profession conclude that treating physicians are less
likely to perform diagnostic tests on women than on men. Id. at 220.
146. Women are more likely than men to be diagnosed with psychological illnesses.
Id.
147. Lee et al., supra note 61, at 1520-22.
148. A similar problem with obtaining medical evidence is suffered by the poor and
homeless. See Michael Diehl, Note, Screening Out Worthy Social Security Disability
Claimants and Its Effect on Homelessness, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 617 (1991).
149. Carolyn B. Kuhl, The Social Security Administration's Nonacquzescence Policy,
1984 DET. C.L. REV. 913 (statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, Department of Justice); see, e.g., Hillhouse v. Hams, 715 F.2d 428 (8th Cir.
1983).
[W]e note the Secretary continues to operate under the belief that she is
not bound by district or circuit court decisions. In its findings the Appeals
Council states, "the Secretary is bound only by the provisions of the So-
cial Security Act, regulations and rulings, and by United States Supreme
Court decisions. A district or circuit court decision is binding only in the
specific case it decides."
Id. at 430.
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that nonacquiesces. 5 ° However, the SSA engages in intracircuit
nonacquiescence frequently'51 and has borne much criticism of
the practice.'52
The SSA publishes formal nonacquiescence rulings,"' engag-
es in informal or secret nonacquiescence, 54 and refuses to ac-
knowledge a conflict.'55 By refusing to acknowledge a conflict on
the issue of evaluating pain, the SSA is, in functional effect,
nonacquiescing.'56 In the evaluation of subjective complaints of
150. Other agencies that nonacquiesce include: the National Labor Relations Board,
the Internal Revenue Service, the Occupational Safety and Health Adminstration, the
United States Postal Service, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Rail-
road Retirement Board. Kubitschek, supra note 45, at 399 n.1. "The term nonacquies-
cence apparently was corned by the Internal Revenue Service rn the 1920's." Deborah
Maranville, Nonacquiscence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of
Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REV. 471, 474 n.5 (1986).
151. Intracircuit nonacquiescence-adjudication without regard to law within that
circuit-is more controversial than mtercircuit nonacquiescence-adjudicating without
regard to the law of different circuits-or venue choice nonacquiescence-adjudicating
using the law of the most favorable venue. Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz,
Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 687 (1989).
152. Rebecca H. White, Time for a New Approach: Why the Judiciary Should Disre-
gard the "Law of the Circuit" When Confronting Nonacquiescence by the National
Labor Relations Board, 69 N.C. L. REV. 639, 646 (1991) (arguing that the NLRB has
been "tarred by the practices of other agencies that engage in nonacquiescence, most
notably the Social Security Administration").
153. Kuhl, supra note 149, at 913. In 1990, the SSA began a policy of publishing
acquiescence rulings when circuit court decisions conflicted with SSA policy. 55 Fed.
Reg. 1012 (1990). No acquiescence ruling has been issued regarding the standard for
evaluating pain.
154. The Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice
explained the practice:
T]he general guidance which the SSA has provided its Administrative
Law Judges is that they should follow agency regulations and guidelines,
without regard to the law in a particular circuit in which a claimant's
case will ultimately be appealed. In addition to this 'informal nonacquies-
cence,' the SSA has sometimes issued formal notices of 'nonacquiescence'
m particularly significant adverse decisions.
Kuhl, supra note 149, at 913; see Thomas B. Wilinsky, Mending the Safety Net's
Safety Net: The Federal Courts Study Committee's Proposals for Reforming the Social
Security Disability Benefits Review Process, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1079,
1090-93 (1991) (outlining types of SSA nonacquiescence).
155. 55 Fed. Reg 1012, 1014 (1990).
156. The official policy in the Federal Register explains:
In the Disability programs, for example, the courts have developed differ-
mg expressions of the rules for weighing various types of evidence or
assessing subjective complaints or symptoms. Although some of these
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pain, the difference between the Fourth Circuit approach and the
SSA approach is subtle yet crucial." 7
Justification for nonacquiescence centers around three main
issues: separation of powers, equal protection, and cost. It is
helpful to put the debate in perspective by looking at the effect of
SSA's nonacquiescence policy in the Hyatt litigation. As Hyatt
demonstrates, the current responses to nonacquiescence are inad-
equate. To reach a satisfactory settlement of substantive issues,
such as the pain standard, either the Supreme Court or Congress
must ban intracircuit nonacquiescence by ruling that agencies
must follow the judicially-established law of the circuit that
would review the action if the venue is known with substantial
certainty To be effective, this rule must include safeguards
against informal, or secret, nonacquiscence.
Separation of Powers
The SSA bases its nonacquiescence policy on a slippery slope
argument. The fear is that one judge, looking at one Social Secu-
rity application, perhaps with particularly moving facts, will
make a wrong decision, a decision appropriate for those specific
facts, or a decision that undermines competing policy consider-
ations.'58 The SSA clearly cannot change its national policy
formulations differ in their wording, they are not mconsistent with our
policy. In such situations, we do not believe that it is necessary to issue
an Acquiescence Ruling. Rather, we may provide instructions to adjudica-
tors to ensure that our policy is followed correctly or revise our regula-
tions to provide more specific policy guidance on the matter at issue.
55 Fed. Reg. 1012 (1990) (emphasis added); see Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 151,
at 699. Estreicher and Revesz note that:
It may well be that SSA is not issuing Acquiescence Rulings for cas-
es in which there are, in fact, irreconcilable inconsistencies between the
agency's position and circuit law, and therefore, decisiomnmakers at all
levels are continuing to apply agency policy even though this policy has
been rejected by the court of appeals which will review the agency's ac-
tion.
Id. (citations omitted).
157. "The Secretary objects primarily to a fine point of semantics-a fime point that
for many in the plaintiff class could signify the difference between obtaining and
being demed benefits." Hyatt v. Heckler, 711 F. Supp. 837, 841 (W.D.N.C. 1989),
affd in part, amended in part, vacated in part, 899 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1990).
158. See generally 55 Fed. Reg. 1012 (1990).
1842 [Vol. 36:1821
1995] SSA NONACQUIESCENCE ON PAIN EVALUATION 1843
every time a district court rules against it. However, as the Hyatt
case illustrates, the SSA is nonacquiesing to decisions made not
on particular facts but on the agency's legal standard. On the
other end of the separation of powers spectrum is unfettered SSA
action. Such deference to the SSA would make the
administration's policy choices unreviewable. 5 9 An appropriate
middle ground between judicial micromanagement and unfettered
discretion must be found. 6'
Critics of nonacquiescence argue that judicial oversight is nec-
essary, while administrative lawyers suggest that notice and
comment, congressional action, and Supreme Court review are
sufficient safeguards. Hyatt, however, illustrates that these safe-
guards are inadequate. Notice and comment does not require
agreement or action, and the SSA is free to disregard the com-
ments.' Congressional micromanagement and review of every
substantive decision is as unworkable as it is undesirable. 62
Although the Supreme Court substantively upheld the Fourth
Circuit decision in Hyatt, the SSA continued the litigation, main-
taining its original position. 3  This administrative solution is
159. Efrat M. Cogan, Note, Executive Nonacquiescence: Problems of Statutory Inter-
pretation and Separation of Powers, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1155 (1987) ("When an
agency is given wide discretion to interpret a statute containing inadequate guide-
lines, the agency falls back on a politically and bureaucratically slanted viewpoint.
This is because agency decisionmaking is not steeped in a tradition of unpartiality.").
160. "This raises the problem of agency accountability: how can we structure ju-
dicial review of agency action so that agencies have enough discretion to implement
complex regulatory programs, and yet assure that they do not become a tyranmcal
'Fourth Branch' of government, immune from popular control?" Thomas W. Merrill,
Judiczal Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 994 (1992).
161. See supra note 156.
162. "The national legislature expresses itself too often in commands that are un-
clear, imprecise, or gap-ridden." Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The
Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (1987). In the area of pam,
Congress attempted to clarify its intention in 1984, but the SSA and Fourth Circuit
interpreted the clarification differently. "[i1t is simply unrealistic, given the vastness
of the federal bureaucracy, to expect that the President or his principal lieutenants
can effectively monitor the policymaking activities of all federal agencies. Nor does it
seem wise or appropriate to leave control of agency behavior to congressional over-
sight hearings." Merrill, supra note 160, at 996-97 (citation omitted).
163. Hyatt v. Bowen, 476 U.S. 1167 (1985). "While the Supreme Court remains,
along with Congress, the arbiter of last resort on statutory issues, its decisional ca-
pacity is small compared to the large number of statutory matters addressed by the
courts of appeals." Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence
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not enough to ensure that claimants are granted the benefits
they deserve.
Acknowledging the necessity of judicial oversight, a ban on
intracircuit nonacquiescence is an imperative first step. In Hyatt,
banning intracircuit nonacquiescence would have solved the prob-
lem of intercircuit nonacquiescence and venue choice nonacquies-
cence, as federal circuit courts were generally in agreement as to
the substantive standard."M The next question is whether forc-
ing the SSA to apply different standards by circuit violates the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Equal Protecton
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees citizens equal protec-
tion of the laws." 5 However, when federal court interpretation
of statutes differs from the SSA's interpretation, inequality re-
sults. The two competing choices are horizontal inequality 6
and vertical inequality 167 Generally, Americans are more toler-
ant of discrimination based on geography than discrimination
based on wealth or fortitude. 8
The SSA objected to the Fourth Circuit's standard for evaluat-
ing pain because it creates vertical inequality 169 However, a
and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99
YALE L.J. 801, 810 (1990).
164. See supra note 99.
165. Uniformity is generally preferred because it promotes the equitable principle of
similar treatment, limits forum-shopping, and conveys equality of legal standards. See
Note, Collateral Estoppel and Nonacquiescence: Precluding Government Relitigation in
the Pursuit of Litigant Equality, 99 HARV. L. REV. 847, 857-59 (1986).
166. Horizontal uniformity treats claimants alike throughout the nation but differ-
ently depending on level of review sought. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 151, at
695.
167. Vertical uniformity treats claimants alike at every stage of review but differ-
ently based on geography. Id.
168. The Secretary emphasizes the disuniformity of a rule which would require
the SSA to apply one legal standard in Connecticut but another in Cali-
fornia. We have just as much, if not more, difficulty with a policy where-
by one claimant is governed by one legal standard but is neighbor, lack-
ing in either financial resources, litigational persistence, or physical or
mental stamina, is governed by another.
Id. at 702 (citing Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
prelim znj. vacated sub nom. Steiberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986)).
169. Hyatt v. Heckler, 579 F Supp. 985, 994 (D.N.C. 1984).
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survey of the circuits indicates that had the SSA acquiesced to
federal court decisions, there would have been greater uniformity
because the Fourth Circuit approach was the dominant ap-
proach."' Even supporters of nonacquiescence acknowledge
that greater judicial review may result in uniformity at the feder-
al level.'
Vertical inequality is criticized on a more fundamental level
because claimants are often unaware that their rights are being
violated.' Even those who are aware of their rights are in a
poor position to litigate in relation to the federal government.'73
Informal, secret nonacquiescence is particularly destructive, as
recognized by courts 74 and commentators." 5 Claimants aware
170. See supra note 99.
171. A policy of automatic acquiescence would always result in greater unifor-
mity within a circuit On the plausible assumption that agencies will
not want to maintain two sets of policies in different circuits over long
periods of time, a policy of automatic acquiescence would probably result
in greater uniformity between circuits as well.
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opznwns as Binding Law and as Explanations for
Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 74-75 (1993).
172. The SSA's clandestine policies have been criticized by the Supreme Court:
[C3lass members were entitled to believe that their Government's
determination of ineligibility was the considered judgment of an agency
faithfilly executing the laws of the United States. Though they knew of
the demal or loss of benefits, they did not and could not know that those
adverse decisions had been made on the basis of a systematic procedural
irregularity that rendered them subject to court challenge. Where the
Government's secretive conduct prevents plaintiffs from knowing of a vio-
lation of rights [and] [s]ince in tis case the full extent of the
Government's clandestine policy was uncovered only in the course of this
litigation, all class members may pursue this action
Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 480-81 (1986) (quoting City of New York
v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 738 (1986)).
173. Vertical inequality "is especially troublesome because the negative impact of the
differential policy will probably fall disporportionately on those parties least able to
bear it." Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 151, at 750. "The government is thus able
to wage a war of attrition-winning some cases, losing others, and counting on the
heavy costs of litigation to discourage other individuals from bringing cases." Note,
supra note 165, at 855-56.
174. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 475 ("Moreover, '[the means of enforcement of the policy,
through internal memoranda, returns, and reviews, has meant that the affected SSD
or SSI applicant as well as counsel, social workers and advisers for a long time were
unaware of its existence.") (quoting City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 1109,
1115 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)); Dixon v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 942, 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(finding that SSA adjudicators systematically misapplied adminstrative directives n-
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of this disparity understandably resent the government, and both
the administrative and judicial branches lose credibility
Although legal standards must be permitted to develop, con-
tinually retrying the same issue is unnecessary and unfair."8
Nonacquiescence, by definition, is pursued in bad faith.'77 For
example, in Hyatt, the SSA was not making a good faith effort to
change past precedent. Rather, it was stubbornly refusing to
abide by the court's decision."7 Courts need the power to pro-
tect individual litigants by creating binding precedent for admin-
istrative agencies.
Cost
The SSA's financial interest in denying the Hyatt class
members' claims is considerable.'79 The cost of efficiently ad-
ministering an immense national benefits system further limits
the flexibility with which the SSA can approach rulemaking.18 °
plementing severity regulation in manner inconsistent with Social Security Act).
175. Even supporters of nonacquiescence require candor. "Where the agency dis-
guises its disagreement by means of a disingenuous distinction of adverse circuit pre-
cedent, it effectively precludes that court from reexamining its ruling, and, therefore,
from participating m the mtercircuit dialogue." Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 151,
at 755 (footnote omitted).
176. For example, in 26 cases the Second Circuit has reiterated its ruling that opin-
ions of treating physicians deserve special consideration in determnung disability.
Kubitschek, supra note 45, at 424.
177. None of these three categories is implicated when an agency attempts n
good faith, and with reasonable basis in fact and law, to distinguish an
adverse decision of a court of appeals. Nonacquiescence arises only where
the agency, unable to invoke such a distinction, nevertheless declines to
be bound by the adverse circuit rule.
Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 151, at 687.
178. "It is a peculiar view of fairness, however, that treats all claimants equally
poorly by depriving them of benefits they will eventually receive if they have the for-
titude to run an administrative gauntlet." Johnson v. United States R.R. Retirement
Bd., 969 F.2d 1082, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
179. If all of the 77,000 Hyatt class members received benefits, a conservative esti-
mate of SSA liability for 1988 is $470,316,000. Hyatt v. Heckler, 711 F. Supp. 837,
838 n.1 (W.D.N.C. 1989), affd in part, amended in part, vacated in part, 899 F.2d
329 (4th Cir. 1990).
180. Economies of scale indicate that the cost of administering the program urn-
formly will be lower than the cost of administering twelve slightly different programs.
Besides lost efficiency, the cost of differential adminstration includes differential
training, instruction manuals, and the "less tangible impact on esprit de corps and
1846
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The exact cost benefit to SSA of applying their pain regulations
uniformly throughout the nation is impossible to calculate. How-
ever, administrative convenience is offset by the cost of defending
their standard in repetitious federal litigation, especially when, as
in Hyatt, the SSA pays attorneys' fees and costs for both sides.
The benefit is offset further by the cost to the claimants and the
judiciary
The Hyatt class representatives accurately portray the extreme
suffering caused by delay or denial of Social Security benefits.
Death, foregone medical treatment, and loss of home and person-
al possessions cause irreparable harm to claimants."' As
Herman Caudle's death illustrates vividly, eventual payment of
back benefits fails to compensate the claimant. 8 This cost out-
weighs administrative inconvenience.
Nonacquiescence directly increases the workload of the judi-
ciary 18 Judges, having to rule on the same issue time after
time understandably lose patience.8 4 Scarce judicial resources
ideological commitment in compelling agency personnel-trained to believe they are
responsible for a unitary, internally coherent set of policies." Estreicher & Revesz,
supra note 151, at 749 n.324. Advocates of the cost considerations fail to mention the
most significant additional cost to abandoning nonacquiescence-the SSA would be
obligated to pay benefits to thousands of additional claimants each year. See supra
note 179.
181. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 483-84 (1986) ("Many persons have
been hospitalized due to the trauma of having disability benefits cut off.") (quoting
City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 1109, 1118 (1984)); Kubitschek, supra
note 45, at 410 ("Newspaper articles have chronicled the deaths of people from ill-
nesses that SSA said they did not have, from the exertion of returning to work after
losing benefits, or from suicide."); Diehl, supra note 148 (arguing that loss of social
security benefits is a significant factor m homelessness).
182. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 428 (1988) ("[Sluffermg months of
delay m receiving the income on wich one has depended for the very necessities of
life cannot be fully remedied by the 'belated restoration of back benefits.');
Kubitschek supra note 45, at 411 ("It can only be concluded that the consequences
of nonacquiescence, in terms of human suffering, are enormous.").
183. "Nonacquiescence is likely to increase the volume of cases reaching the federal
courts. The contribution that nonacquiescence makes to burgeoning federal case-
loads is a cost that must be considered." Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 151, at
750. "The potential for overwhelming the courts with challenges to agency determi-
nations is staggering." Diller & Morawetz, supra note 163, at 808.
184. Nonacquiescence results m "considerable judicial hostility." Harold H. Bruff,
Coordinating Judicial Review in Administrative Law, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1207
(1992).
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increase competition and cost for everyone."'
Intracircuit nonacquiescence is indefensible and unfair. Given
the necessity of judicial check on agency power within a circuit,
the legitimacy of any nonacquiescence is questionable.186 Nonac-
quiescence as practiced by the SSA throughout Hyatt is not justi-
fied by the need for administrative independence or concerns for
equality and cost. As practitioners have noted, to allow agencies
to disregard established law is to allow anarchy 187
Summary of Responses
Four options exist for banning administrative agency,
intracircuit nonacquiescence. First, the Supreme Court could rule
that agencies must follow the judicially-established law of the
circuit that would review the action, thereby banning intracircuit
nonacquiescence. Second, Congress could specifically address
nonacquiescence, either in the Administrative Procedure Act or
in the Social Security Disability enabling statute. Third, courts of
appeals and district courts could sanction agencies by use of
injunctions, contempt proceedings, or Rule 11 sanctions. Finally,
agencies could show restraint and acquiesce to a circuit's law
The Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of
intracircuit nonacquiescence,118  although commentators have
urged the Court to do so.189 Without resolution of the procedur-
185. The costs of an overcrowded federal court system will probably fall most
heavily on poor litigants who may be denied their day in court because of
their inability to compete effectively for increasingly scarce judicial re-
sources. To the extent that our procedural system is concerned with
the promotion of equal justice and, in particular, with the full and fair
opportunity to be heard, this increase m the cost of effective access is
especially intolerable.
Note, supra note 165, at 857-58 (citations omitted).
186. "The Supreme Court, the courts of appeals, and the district courts all exercise
the same constitutional power-the judicial power-and all conduct their affairs in
fundamentally similar ways." Merrill, supra note 171, at 59.
187. Attorneys have characterized SSA's nonacquiescence policy as "anarchy."
Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 151, at 771.
188. Congress suggested that "the legal and Constitutional issues raised by non-
acquiescence can only be settled by the Supreme Court." H.R. REP. No. 618, supra
note 87, at 38, reprznted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3096.
189. For a thorough summary of the constitutional arguments, see Dan T. Coenen,
The Constitutional Case Against Intraczrcuit Nonacquzescence, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1339
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al issue by the Supreme Court, advocates will be forced to either
continually litigate the same issue or to bring every substantive
issue to the attention of Congress. The latter tactic succeeded
only once.
Congress expressed reservations about nonacquiescence after
the uproar in the early 1980s over the SSA's termination of bene-
fits of thousands of disabled Americans. 90 Congress stepped in
to resolve the substantive issue by requiring medical improve-
ment before terminating benefits. Although solving the substan-
tive issue of the termination of benefits, Congress failed to ad-
dress the procedural issues of nonacquiescence, thereby leaving
open the potential for substantive issues such as the standard for
evaluating pain to create similar problems.
A 1984 House bill would have forced the SSA to follow court of
appeals opinions, thereby barring nonacquiescence. 9l A Senate
bill would have required procedural safeguards, including pub-
lishing a statement in the Federal Register before the SSA could
nonacquiesce.' 9 The conference agreement omitted any formal
policy, but voiced concerns about the SSA's nonacquiescence
policy 193
(1991). For a summary of court decisions on nonacquiescence see Johnson v. United
States R.R. Retirement Bd., 969 F.2d 1082, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Coenen, supra, at
1377; Kubitschek, supra note 45. For a summary of the academic debate, see Coenen,
supra; Kubitschek, supra note 45.
190. "[Als the legislative history of the 1984 Reform Act makes abundantly
clear, Congress confronted a paralyzing breakdown m a vital social program,
which it sought to rescue from near-total anarchy." Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S.
412, 438 (1988).
191. H.R. 3755, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 302(a) (1984) (requiring SSA "compliance
with Court of Appeals Decisions").
192. S. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(a)(1) (1984) ("[T]he Secretary shall pub-
lish in the Federal Register, a statement of the Secretary's decision to acquiesce or
not acquiesce in such court decision, and the specific facts and reasons in support of
the Secretary's decision."). Furthermore, a letter from seven Senators urged the con-
ference committee to ban nonacquiescence, saying "this is one of the most crucial
issues to be resolved in the debate over disability reform." 130 CONG. REC. 25, 804
(1984) (letter from Sens. Bingaman, Byrd, Riegle, Sasser, Mitchell, Kennedy, and
Metzenbaum to members of the conference committee dated June 25, 1984).
193. H.R. REP. No. 618, supra note 87, at 37, reprinted in, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3095. The conference agreement reads in relevant part:
The conferees do not intend that the agreement to drop both provisions
be interpreted as approval of "non-acquiescence" by a federal agency to
an interpretation of a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals as a general practice.
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The Hyatt litigation demonstrates that resolution by the Su-
preme Court or Congress is required to resolve substantive issues
without repeated litigation of the same issue, which has caused
needless congestion in the federal courts.
Nonacquiescence has been criticized sharply by judges.' Be-
sides chastising the Secretary for his position, some judges have
threatened to sanction the SSA by bringing contempt proceed-
ings.'95 In at least two cases, ALJs sued the SSA, challenging
policies including nonacquiescence which, they argued, impaired
their right to decisional independence. 9 ' Both suits failed be-
cause the courts held that the ALJs lacked standing.'97
The Supreme Court, in a six to three decision, held that im-
proper termination of benefits in the early 1980s did not give rise
to claims for money damages against the government officials
On the contrary, the conferees note that questions have been raised about
the constitutional basis of non-acquiescence and many of the conferees
have strong concerns about some of the ways in which this policy has
been applied, even if constitutional, Thus, the conferees urge that a policy
of non-acquiescence be followed only in situations where the Administra-
tion has initiated or has the reasonable expectation and intention of initi-
ating the steps necessary to receive a review of the issue in the Supreme
Court.
Id.
194. Judge Weis, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit, summed up judicial sentiment well, saying:
The non-acquiescence policy of an agency results in intolerable and inex-
cusable expense to litigants, as well as in the unnecessary and wasteful
expenditure of scarce judicial resources. But perhaps most objectionable is
the disrespect for the administration of justice generated by the spectacle
of a federal agency which refuses to acknowledge that a court's ruling
applies to it as well as to other litigants. That an agency, which acts as
judge, jury, and prosecutor in proceedings before it, should assert the
right to disregard the law expounded by an Article III court is repugnant
to our system of government. [W]hen an agency follows that practice,
it operates outside the law.
Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Agency Non-Acquzescence-Respectful Lawlessness or Legitimate
Disagreement?, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 845, 851-52 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
195. "i have no wish to invite a confrontation with the Secretary. Yet, if the Secre-
tary persists in pursuing her nonacquiescence in this circuit's decisions, I will seek to
bring contempt proceedings against the Secretary both in her official and individual
capacities." Hillhouse v. Harris, 715 F.2d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1983) (McMillian, J.,
concurring).
196. Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 813 (1989);
D'Amico v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1983).
197. Nash, 869 F.2d at 678; D'Aznco, 698 F.2d at 906.
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who administered the program,""8 although a number of circuits
awarded EAJA fees to litigants. 99
Judges also have considered imposing injunctions to force the
SSA to follow circuit precedent."' 0 The Second Circuit declined
to impose an injunction requiring the SSA to follow the treating
physician rule,201 hesitating to impose contempt for non-compli-
ance with the injunction.0 2 Although the SSA argued that they
were acquiescing to the treating physician rule, the court seemed
skeptical, especially as counsel for the Secretary acknowledged
during the argument that the Secretary had failed to inform
adjudicators of the content of the rule.203 Instead of imposing
the injunction, the court ordered the SSA to formulate and issue
instructions to all adjudicators explaining the treating physician
rule.20 4
198. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988). The dissent argued:
Acknowledging that the trauma respondents and others like them suffered
as a result of the allegedly unconstitutional acts of state and federal offi-
cials "must surely have gone beyond what anyone of normal sensibilities
would wish to see imposed on innocent disabled citizens," the Court does
not for a moment suggest that the retroactive award of benefits to which
respondents were always entitled remotely approximates full compensation
for such trauma.
Because I believe legislators of "normal sensibilities" would not wish
to leave such traumatic mjuries unrecompensed, I find it inconceivable
that Congress meant by mere silence to bar all redress for such mjuries.
Id. at 431-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
199. See, e.g., Perket v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 129 (6th
Cir. 1990); Rhoten v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1988).
200. See Maranville, supra note 150, at 536-37 (discussing the difficulty of
sanctioning administrative agencies for intracircuit nonacquiescence).
201. The treating physician rule provides that a treating physician's opinion on the
subject of medical disability is binding unless contradicted by substantial evidence and
is entitled to extra weight because the treating physician is most familiar with the
claimant's medical condition. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F..2d 29, 31 (2nd Cir. 1986)
(citing Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76 (2nd Cir. 1986)).
202. Id. at 35.
203. Id. at 37.
204. Id. at 38 ("This will munmize intrusion into the administrative process and at
the same time accord the Secretary the opportunity to demonstrate his good-faith
compliance with the law of this Circuit and his readiness to take appropriate action
to see that law implemented throughout the administrative process he supervises.").
Actually, the court merely required that the SSA promulgate the instructions ordered
in Schzsler, 787 F.2d at 84. The court in Schzsler, said:
Certainly the detail and complexity of SSA publications belies any claim
that an issue as controversial and as litigation breeding as the treating
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In the Tenth Circuit, the court imposed Rule 11 sanctions
against the Secretary for ignoring the treating physician rule and
for denying benefits." 5 The court stated:
When evidence supporting the Secretary is so slight and the
contrary evidence so overwhelming, a reasonable attorney for
the Secretary could not have concluded that the minimal sup-
porting evidence constituted the "substantial evidenc6" needed
to affirm the administrative decision Thus, the Secretary
objectively could not have believed the position taken here to
be "well-grounded in fact," as Rule 11 requires." 6
These sanctions inspired some Justice Department attorneys to
refuse to defend the Secretary's position.0 7
The SSA program of terminating benefits in the early 1980s
physician rule is too trivial a matter to be included. The cost of properly
instructing its adjudicators is numnal in light of the great benefits to be
gained by avoiding unnecessary delay to claimants and unnecessary review
by the courts.
Id.
205. Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1988).
206. Id. at 674.
207. 130 CONG. REC. 25,986 (1984) (statement of Sen. Moynihan). In addition,
Rudolph Giulam, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, explained:
One aspect of our decision-making process should be very clear. The deci-
sions of the Second Circuit are the law which we adhere to and apply in
our analysis and review. There has been much public discussion this year
about HHS's "nonacquiescence policy." It is our view that this policy,
whatever it does permit, surely does not allow the United States
Attorney's Office, HHS or any other federal agency to refuse to follow
clear rules of law decided by the United States Court of Appeals. Properly
applied, as it has been for years by the Internal Revenue Service, it per-
mits a federal agency to decline to follow nationwide the ruling in one
particular Circuit. However, there has never been any support to my
knowledge for the notion that federal agencies within a particular Circuit
could disagree with and refuse to follow clear rulings of that Circuit. We
have not defended cases in the past by disregarding the law of this Cir-
cuit and will not do so in the future.
130 CONG. REC. 24,700-701 (1984) (letter from Rudolph W. Giuliani, United States
Attorney, Southern District of New York, to Chief Judge Constance Baker Motley
dated June 25, 1984).
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highlighted nonacquiescence. °8  At least one commentator
speculated that "the current uproar over nonacquiescence is in
part a product of unique historical circumstances,"2" pointing
out that the IRS and the NLRB had nonacquiesced for de-
cades.21° However, as Hyatt illustrates, nonacquiescence is not
an isolated event and is not limited to any one substantive issue.
Instead, it appears that since the 1984 congressional expression
of disapproval of nonacquiescence, the SSA has continued the
practice without interruption. Thus, merely encouraging the SSA
to limit its own use of nonacquiescence has fallen on deaf ears.
Deferring to Agency restraint and judicial imposition (or
threats) of sanctions have proved ineffectual in ending
intracircuit nonacquiescence. Thus, the Supreme Court or Con-
gress must impose a ban on intracircuit nonacquiescence. A rule
that agencies must follow the judicially-established law of the
circuit that would review the action will solve the procedural
issue of nonacquiescence and allow the resolution of substantive
issues such as the standard for evaluating pain in social security
disability claims.
CONCLUSION
As the war between administrative agencies and the federal
judiciary rages forward, the battle in Hyatt seems a draw The
SSA standard for evaluating pain complies with the Fourth Cir-
cuit standard, so that the substantive issue is precariously at
peace. However, the SSA never submitted to federal jurisdiction
and continues its policy of nonacquiescence, leaving the proce-
dural issue unresolved. As with many legal wars, the litigant
soldiers and the citizen taxpayers lose.
It is imperative that the procedural issue-the validity of
intracircuit nonacquiescence-be resolved. Without resolution by
208. White, supra note 152, at 641.
209. Maranville, supra note 150, at 530 n.198.
210. Id. at 530.
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Congress or the Supreme Court, substantive issues such as the
standard for evaluating pain will remain uncertain. The claim-
antsi whom these laws were created to protect, will suffer un-
necessarily and unjustifiably
Enn Margaret Masson
